The Comprehensive Peace Agreement Of Southern Sudan
Bicameral national legislation will be put in place: the National Assembly will be composed of certain percentages (NCP 52% SPLM 28% other parties from the North 14% from other parties from the South 6%); Two representatives of each State shall be represented in the Council of States. Three agreements had to be concluded in order to reach a comprehensive peace agreement: one on permanent ceasefire agreements, the other on the implementation of all signed protocols and the agreement on permanent ceasefire agreements to be concluded, and the other on international/regional guarantees. Negotiations between the parties on the permanent ceasefire protocol were stalled at the round table held in Naivasha in July 2004. The parties failed to reach agreement on a number of issues, including the transfer of armed forces in eastern Sudan and the financing of the SPLM/A. Today, ten years ago, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ended twenty-one years of civil war in Sudan. The internationally negotiated agreement between the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) in the north and Sudan`s rebel forces People`s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A, then SPLM) was hailed as a huge achievement. However, a decade later, an independent South Sudan is plunged into civil conflict, political tensions and rebel violence are frequent in Sudan, and the CPA has failed to achieve peace and stability. But it didn`t take long for the cracks to come to light. Vice President Garang died in a helicopter crash weeks after taking office and was replaced by Salva Kiir, who later became president of South Sudan. Unlike Garang, Kiir and other SPLM/A leaders did not invest in a united Sudan and, instead of facilitating Sudanese unity, they worked to lay the foundation for an independent South Sudan. At the same time, the NCP has failed to implement the necessary political reforms to create a democratic and inclusive unity government and integrate the SPLM/A. Given that neither side made Sudanese unity a viable and attractive option, it is not surprising that the countries of the South voted for secession in the 2011 referendum.
The United Nations has closely followed and supported the regional peace initiative under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). M. Mohamed Sahnoun, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General, and other senior officials represented the United Nations at IGAD summit meetings and consulted with Governments and regional organizations in support of the peace process. They also participated in meetings of the IGAD Partners Forum, composed of donor countries and organizations that support the IGAD peace process and help the regional organization improve its capacity in several areas. The provisions regarding South Kordofan/Nuba and Blue Nile were different from those of Abyei. The key provisions of the agreement did not directly concern the two states, as the PCA expected them to remain in the North. The two regions, located on the north-south border, were however hard hit by the war, especially after its resumption in 1983. Local complaints about control of the country have led some parts of the population to side with the south.
The PCA therefore recognized that any comprehensive regulation must address the problems of these states. They got a slightly different structure of government, with more detailed provisions on state-local government relations and revenue sharing. The PCA has also established, in each state, a land commission to address the territorial disputes that have been at the centre of much of the conflict. . . .